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Abstract. We investigate the structure of global inter-firm linkages using a dataset
that contains information on business partners for about 400, 000 firms worldwide,
including all the firms listed on the major stock exchanges. Among the firms, we
examine three networks, which are based on customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and
strategic alliance relationships. First, we show that these networks all have scale-free
topology and that the degree distribution for each follows a power law with an exponent
of 1.5. The shortest path length is around six for all three networks. Second, we show
through community structure analysis that the firms comprise a community with those
firms that belong to the same industry but different home countries, indicating the
globalization of firms’ production activities. Finally, we discuss what such production
globalization implies for the proliferation of conflict minerals (i.e., minerals extracted
from conflict zones and sold to firms in other countries to perpetuate fighting) through
global buyer-supplier linkages. We show that a limited number of firms belonging to
some specific industries and countries plays an important role in the global proliferation
of conflict minerals. Our numerical simulation shows that regulations on the purchases
of conflict minerals by those firms would substantially reduce their worldwide use.
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Conflict minerals
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21. Introduction
Many complex physical systems can be modeled and better understood as complex
networks [1, 2, 3]. Recent studies show that economic systems can also be regarded as
complex networks in which economic agents, like consumers, firms, and governments,
are closely connected [4, 5]. To understand the interaction among economic agents, we
must uncover the structure of economic networks.
Our focus in this paper is on inter-firm networks. Over the last several years, a pair
of critical incidences revealed the global interconnection of firms: the financial turmoil
triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and the disruption of
worldwide supply chains caused by the 2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami in
Japan. These incidences sparked interest in inter-firm networks by network scientists,
economists, and sociologists. Several aspects of inter-firm relationships were previously
studied, including the firm and bank relationship [6], the customer-supplier relationship
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11], and the ownership relationship (i.e., which firm owns which firm)
[12, 13]). The degree distribution follows a power law, and the shortest path-lengths for
any pair of firms are around five [11, 14, 15]. Newman’s community analysis [16, 17]
also shows that firms tend to transact with each other when they belong to the same
industry and/or are located in the same state or prefecture [18]. The structure of the
inter-firm networks investigated was found to be stable [15].
One limitation of previous studies is that they mainly addressed inter-firm
relationships within a country, so they have little to say about the linkages of firms in
different countries. Important exceptions include studies on global ownership structure
[19], and global R&D partnerships [20]. However, no work has yet investigated the
structure of global customer-supplier linkages, which is the key to understanding the
nature of the above incidences (i.e., the global financial crisis and the disruption of global
supply chains by natural disasters). Given this background, we investigate the global
aspect of inter-firm linkages using a unique dataset that contains information on business
relationships (both domestic and international) for about 400, 000 firms worldwide.
This is the first contribution of this paper. Note that if one aggregates transactions
(purchases and sales) at the firm level, one obtains transactions at the country level,
called international trade by economists. The network structure of international trade
has recently been studied by economists and physicists [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Our
investigation of international transactions at the firm level is closely related to those
studies, but our firm level data reveal that firms are more likely to transact with other
firms in the same industry rather than other firms in the same home country, which is
quite different from what is assumed in studies on international trade. We will expand
this point below.
After examining the structure of global inter-firm networks, we discuss the
implications of global linkages at the firm level for the proliferation of ”conflict minerals”
through global buyer-supplier linkages. This is the second contribution of this paper.
Conflict minerals are natural minerals (gold, tin, tungsten, etc.) th
3from conflict zones and sold to perpetuate fighting. The most prominent example is
the natural minerals extracted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by
armed groups and funneled through a variety of intermediaries before being purchased
by multinational electronics firms in industrial countries. There is wide discussion on
how to mitigate the worldwide spread of conflict minerals [27, 28, 29]. For example,
the U.S. government passed a law in July 2010 that requires listed firms to audit their
supply chains and report the use in their products of conflict minerals from the DRC
or adjoining countries [30]. In this paper, we conduct simulation analysis using our
firm level data on global buyer-supplier linkages to evaluate the effectiveness of various
measures to mitigate the worldwide propagation of conflict minerals through global
supply chains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed
description of our dataset, and section 3 looks at the basic features of inter-firm networks,
including degree distributions. Section 4 examines how closely firms are interconnected
by measuring the shortest path lengths between them. Section 5 conducts community
analysis employing a network’s modularity defined by Newman. Section 6 conducts
simulation analysis to investigate the proliferation of conflict minerals through global
supply chains. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Dataset
For this research, we used a unique dataset compiled by S&P Capital IQ, which is part
of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. [31]. The dataset covers 423, 024 major incorporated
firms with information of business relationships in 217 countries in 159 industry sectors
that were defined by the S&P, including all the listed firms in the world. These firms
have such attributions as location, industry sector, and annual total revenue. The
dataset has lists of core partners (i.e., customers, suppliers, licensors, licensees, and
strategic alliances) in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or 2014) and in some years over the
entire sample period (almost all relationships date from 2000) for a firm with IDs. For
example, the numbers of core customers and suppliers for IBM are 446 and 184 firms in
the recent period and 1565 and 755 firms in some years over the entire sample period.
The following relationship exists between customers and suppliers. When firm j is a
supplier to firm i, firm i is a customer of firm j. Licensees and licensors have such an
opposite relationship.
3. Scale-free global inter-firm networks
We first show the common scale-free properties of three global inter-firm networks, which
are based on customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and strategic alliance relationships.
Figure 1 describes a global customer-supplier network. Many international linkages
through U.S., European, and Japanese firms are observed. Licensee-licensor and
strategic alliance networks have identical characteristics. We investigate the cumulative
4distribution functions (CDFs) of links across firms for the following linkages: customer,
supplier, licensee, licensor, and strategic alliance. In figure 2, the horizontal axis is the
number of links, and the vertical axis represents the cumulative densities. The CDFs
of each kind of linkage have tails that follow a power law function. The power law
exponents are about 1.5 as follows:
Supplier :P>(Ns) ∝ N
−1.5
s , (1)
Customer :P>(Nc) ∝ N
−1.5
c , (2)
Licensee :P>(Nle) ∝ N
−1.5
le , (3)
Licensor :P>(Nlo) ∝ N
−1.5
lo , (4)
Strategic alliance :P>(Nsa) ∝ N
−1.5
sa , (5)
where N is the number of links for each type of linkage. The 1.5 exponent is observed
on the distribution both in the recent period and in some years over the entire sample
period. Networks with such power laws are called scale-free networks.
4. Six degrees of separation between major incorporated firms
We measure the shortest path lengths (SPLs) for each pair of firms i and j in a non-
directed customer-supplier network over the entire sample period. The number of firms
on it is 345, 909, so there are about 60 billion pairs. Although the density for the
linkages in this network is very low, only 1.1×10−5, the number of firms in its maximum
connected component is 318, 080, which is about 92.0% of all the firms. Figure 3 shows
the SPL distribution for the connected pairs. The mode of distribution is five path
lengths, and about 80% of the pairs are connected by six path lengths or fewer. We also
investigate the mode for the directed customer-supplier network to consider intermediate
products or money flow. This mode is also short, only seven path lengths. We also
measure the SPLs in non-directed licensee-licensor, directed licensee-licensor, and non-
directed strategic alliance networks. The number of firms, the network density for the
linkages, the size of the maximum connected component, and the mode of the SPLs are
shown in table 1. The mode in these networks is also short: around six path lengths.
The SPL distribution of a domestic non-directed customer-supplier network was
previously reported [11, 14, 15]. In the Japanese case, the mode of SPL distribution
is five path lengths. International linkages for firms were not taken in these previous
studies; the actual SPL for the Japanese firm’s pairs is shorter than five path lengths.
We compare SPLs for firm’s pairs in the same country in a global customer-supplier
network and a domestic customer-supplier network that has only domestic linkages.
Figure 4 shows the probability that SPLs are extended by being limited to domestic
linkages in the United States or Japan. In the Japanese case of SPL ≥ 5 and the U.S.
case of SPL ≥ 7 in a global customer-supplier network, the probability is over 0.5.
This result suggests that the effect from foreign countries cannot be ignored, because
international relationships are indispensable for handling incidents in supply chains.
55. Firms’ community structure
Global inter-firm networks are built by multiple communities. Detecting the
communities in networks means the appearance of dense connected groups of vertices
and sparse connections among groups. We adopt modularity as a quality function of
communities introduced by Newman and detect them by a fast greedy algorithm of
modularity maximization that is one effective approach to identify communities [32]. If
network V is divided into L subsets {V1, V2, · · · , VL} which do not overlap and are not
empty, modularity Q is defined as
Q =
L∑
i=1
(eii − a
2
i ) =
1
2M
∑
l∈Vi
∑
m∈Vi
Alm −

 1
2M
∑
l∈Vi
∑
m∈Vi
Alm


2
, (6)
where Alm is an element of adjacent matrix which indicates the number of links between
nodes l and m. eii and ai are the link densities within subset Vi and the number of
links that connect in to subsets Vi, respectively. When the subsets {V1, V2, · · · , VL} are
selected randomly, eii is canceled out by a
2
i , which gives the expectation value of the
network density for the linkages in subset Vi. Using the modularity we can compare the
actual network density for linkages in a subset with its expectation value. When Q ≃ 0,
the network has no statistically significant communities, unlike randomly connected
networks. On the other hand, Q ≃ 1 corresponds to a network which is almost perfectly
partitioned into modules.
The maximum modularities of non-directed customer-supplier, non-directed
licensor-licensee, and strategic alliance networks over the entire sample period are 0.64,
0.75, and 0.74, respectively. Such sufficiently large modularity means that significant
communities exist in the networksDWe characterize each community by checking the
majority attributes (e.g., country and industry sector) of the firms in the community.
Because firm attribution bias can be found in each network, we compare the fraction of
the firms’ attribution in each community with the fraction in all communities by Ri,l,
which is defined as
Ri,l =
fraction of attribution i in community l in network
fraction of attribution i in all communities in network
. (7)
The p-values for the fraction of the firms’ attribution in each community are calculated
using the null hypothesis that the firms’ attribution is independent of community.
First, we investigate the communities in the licensee-licensor network with the
highest modularity over the entire sample period. The network has 4, 493 communities.
However, the top four account for over 50% of all firms: 22.9%, 18.3%, 7.7%, and
3.8%. Table 2 shows the fraction of firms’ attributions with a p-value < 0.01 among
the top four communities. We focus on the remarkable attributions with Ri,l ≥ 3 in
each attribution to identify the community characteristics. The largest community is
mainly comprised of movies, entertainment, semiconductors, and broadcasting firms.
Many Taiwan firms appertain to this community. The major industry in Taiwan is
semiconductors. Therefore, the largest community expresses sectors for broadcasting
6technology. As shown in table 2, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest communities show
the ICT sectors in health care, the apparel sectors, and the chemical industry sectors,
respectively. The licensee-licensor relationships between major incorporated firms tend
to be confined to similar industrial sectors over the boundaries between countries.
We next focus on over the entire sample period a non-directed strategic alliance
network which has 1, 995 communities. The top four account for 18.1%, 17.2%, 10.8%,
and 9.5% of all the firms. In each community, the firms belong to the similar industrial
sectors but different home countries. The largest community mainly includes firms in
ICT sectors (i.e., IT consulting and other services, communications equipment, system
software) as shown in table 3. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest communities express heavy
industry, bank and resort development, and medicine sectors, respectively.
We also investigate firms’ attribution in each community in a non-directed
customer-supplier network over the entire sample period. The network has 3, 463
communities. The top four account for 20.9%, 20.7%, 12.0%, and 5.9% of all the firms.
The 2nd and 3rd largest communities show industry sectors, such as aerospace/defense
and health care (table 4). On the other hand, the 4th largest community shows
transactions in the ASEAN free trade area because Southeast Asian firms tend to densely
connect to firms in the same area. Since various industries are included in the largest
community (table 4), we further divide the largest one into discrete sub-communities.
The major sub-communities express some industry sectors. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
largest sub-communities show the broadcasting technology sectors, department stores
(i.e., apparel and restaurant sector), and the electronic equipment sectors, respectively
(table 5).
As cited above, major incorporated firms tend to have worldwide connections. We
investigate the relationship between firm size and geographical distance to business
partner. Here, firm size is measured by the total 2013 revenue. As shown in figure 5,
the mean of the geographical distance in a customer-supplier network is about 3, 400 km,
which is shorter than in other inter-firm networks (i.e., 3, 700 km for strategic alliance
relationships and 4, 300 km for licensee-licensor relationships). Because firms choose
suppliers and customers by taking into consideration transport costs and product price,
the mean of the geographical distance of the customer-supplier network is short. As
represented by the 4th largest community in the customer-supplier network, a large
community that expresses a region is only observed in this network. In inter-firm
networks, the geographical distance of a large firm whose annual total revenue exceeds
103 million dollars tends to be long; large firms are affected by the economic conditions
in distant unexpected countries.
76. Simulation for conflict minerals proliferation
We follow the recent literature on supply chains [33, 34] and introduce the following
simple diffusion model that resembles PageRank:


g1(t+ 1)
g2(t+ 1)
...
gN(t+ 1)


=


1− q1 0 · · · 0
0 1− q2· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · ·1− qN




0 a12 · · ·a1N
a21 0 · · ·a2N
...
...
. . .
...
aN1aN2· · · 0




g1(t)
g2(t)
...
gN(t)


+


ǫ1(t)
ǫ2(t)
...
ǫN (t)


(8)
We explain this general model using an example for conflict minerals. gi(t) is the amount
of conflict minerals possessed by firm i at time t, ǫi(t) is the amount of conflict minerals
that are extracted by firm i at time t that doesn’t stem from customer-supplier chains,
qi expresses the rate at which they are consumed as a port of the final consumption
products in firm i, and aij is an element in an input-output matrix. Typical element aij
equals 1/NˆCj if firm i is a customer of firm j and zero otherwise. In the standard notation
adopted in input-output analysis, aij represents the share of output j (i.e., commodity
produced by firm j) in the total intermediate output use of firm i. We have information
on whether firm i purchases something from firm j, but no information on the amount
of output j purchased by firm i; this is the thickness of each customer link. Since we
assume that the customer links of firm j have identical thickness, aij = 1/Nˆ
C
j if firm
i is a customer of firm j and zero otherwise. From PageRank theory, it is trivial that
gi(t) converges on gi(t− 1) at time t =∞ when all qi satisfy the inequality, 0 < qi ≤ 1.
We simulate the diffusion of the conflict minerals that are mined in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and all of its nine neighbors: Angola, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia. We simply assume that ǫi(t) is time independent and set the total 2013
revenue of each firm in the “metals and mining” upper-sector (which includes aluminum,
diversified metals and mining, gold, precious metals and minerals, silver, and steel
sectors) in these countries to ǫi(t). Here, for ǫi(t) for some firms whose total revenue
is not recorded in this dataset, we substitute the mean of the total revenue of the firm
whose total revenue is recorded in this upper-sector and these countries. Except for
these firms, ǫi(t) = 0. All initial values are gi(0) = 0.
We ran the model until gi(t) practically converges on gi(t − 1) on the customer-
supplier network without banking sectors over the entire sample period. Figure 6 shows
a simulated amount of the conflict minerals per firm in each country when all qi = 0.3.
The conflict minerals drift down to the firms even in most developed countries. In the
G8 countries the top ten industry sectors in which many conflict minerals hide products
are shown in table 6. Conflict minerals are found in the “electrical components and
equipment” sector in G8. The “metals and mining” upper-sector and the “trading
companies and distributors” sector have only 3.4% of all the firms in the G8 and account
for 94.6% of the total conflict minerals in G8.
8We numerically demonstrate the simplified regulation that all firms in the “metals
and mining” upper-sector and the “trading companies and distributors” sector in G8
must not distribute conflict minerals to their customers; the qis of these firms are one
and qi = 0.3 otherwise. As shown in table 6, the amount of conflict minerals is reduced
in each sector. The conflict minerals in the “electrical components and equipment” and
“alternative carriers” sectors fell by over 97%, where they substantially improved their
conflict minerals issues.
We numerically show that the amount of conflict minerals would decrease effectively
outside the G8 by a regulation on the purchases of conflict minerals directed at 3% of
all the firms in G8. We selected the 3% firms in each of the following conditions and
dammed the conflict mineral flow; their qis are one and qi = 0.3 otherwise.
Condition 1 Firms are selected in descending order of the number of supplier links in
G8.
Condition 2 Only listed firms are selected in descending order of the number of
supplier links in G8.
Condition 3 Firms are selected in descending order of the number of supplier links in
the “metals and mining” upper-sector and “trading companies and distributors”
sectors in G8.
Table 7 shows the numerical simulation results of the regulation with each condition.
In condition 1, the selected 3% firms decreased distribution of all conflict minerals by
35.0% in G8. However, the amount of conflict minerals hardly changed in the other
firms. A U.S. federal law for conflict minerals among the listed firms was passed on
July 21, 2010 [30]. Condition 2 expresses the situation where this law is applied to all
the listed firms in G8. Although the trend improved slightly from 35.0% to 43.2% in
G8, the amount of conflict minerals also hardly decreased outside of the selected firms.
On the other hand, we confirmed a dramatic reduction in condition 3. The selected
3% of firms decreased distribution of all conflict minerals by 97.3% in G8 and created
a block that intercepted about 12.0% of all the conflict minerals outside of G8, DRC,
and DRC’s neighbors.
7. Conclusion
We investigated the structure of global inter-firm relationships using a unique dataset
that contains the information of business relationships for 423, 024 major incorporated
firms and focused on three different networks: a customer-supplier network through
which products and services flow; a licensee-licensor network through which technical
information and know-how flow; and a strategic alliance network through which both
flow mutually.
These networks have common scale-free properties. The degree distributions follow
a power law with an exponent of 1.5. The shortest path length for each pair of firms
is around six for all three networks. We showed through community structure analysis
9that the firms comprise a community with those firms that belong to the same industry
but different home countries, indicating the globalization of firms’ production activities.
We measured the mean of the geographical distance between the firms and their
business partners. It was 3, 400 km between business partners for customer-supplier
relationships, which is shorter than for the two other relationships. This result suggests
that technical information and know-how without high transport costs have the potential
to be diffused rapidly worldwide. We also confirmed that the geographical distance
between business partners for large firms tends to be long.
Finally, by utilizing a simple diffusion model and empirical results where firms
comprise a community with those firms that belong to the same industry but different
home countries, we showed numerically that regulations on the purchases conflict
minerals by limited number of G8 firms belonging to some specific industries would
substantially reduce their worldwide use. When these firms refuse to buy conflict
minerals from their suppliers, the supply chains of many intermediaries which are
positioned upstream suffer. Future work will accurately estimate each intermediary’s
amount of damage and the model’s parameters by comprehensively collecting the data
of global inter-firm relationships. Part of the money which was spent in firms flows into
conflict minerals through multiple inter-firm networks. Future work will also expand our
model by connecting a customer-supplier network with licensee-licensor and strategic
alliance networks. This expanded model might help make more effective policies for
conflict minerals. Recently, the global diffusion of weaponry, technical know-how,
conflict oil, and natural gas through lawful trades is also attracting attention. Our
results might resolve such issues and contribute to global peace.
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Tables
Table 1. Number of firms, network density for linkages, maximum connected
component size, and mode of shortest path lengths in customer-supplier (CS), licensee-
licensor (LL), and strategic alliance (SA) networks in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or
2014) and over entire sample period.
Density Mode
% of max.
# of firms Non-directed Directed conected component Non-directed Directed
CS net.a 345, 909 1.1× 10−5 5.7× 10−6 92.0% 5 7
CS net.b 123, 052 2.5× 10−5 1.3× 10−5 85.4% 6 8
LL net.a 36, 264 6.5× 10−5 3.6× 10−5 60.4% 6 8
LL net.b 12, 646 1.6× 10−4 8.5× 10−5 54.3% 8 8
SA net.a 124, 444 2.3× 10−5 – 77.8% 6 –
SA net.b 47, 877 4.9× 10−5 – 64.8% 6 –
a Entire sample period. b Recent period.
Table 2. Top 5 fractions of firms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities
in non-directed licensee-licensor network. R, which expresses ratio between actual
fraction and the fraction obtained by random selection, is defined by equation (7).
Bold font indicates remarkable attributes with R ≥ 3.
Rank Country (fraction (> 0.01), R) Industry sector (fraction (> 0.01), R)
1 United Kingdom (0.067, 1.18) Movies and entertainment (0.105, 3.68)
Japan (0.043, 1.50) Semiconductors (0.083, 4.16)
Taiwan (0.033, 3.34) Broadcasting (0.076, 4.07)
France (0.026, 1.31) Internet software and services (0.061, 1.55)
South Korea (0.020, 1.72) Application software (0.056, 1.19)
2 United States (0.551, 1.13) Internet software and services (0.346, 6.03)
Japan (0.047, 1.65) Application software (0.296, 5.59)
Germany (0.040, 1.44) Asset Management and custody banks (0.073, 2.74)
Switzerland (0.029, 2.50) Health care technology (0.052, 4.36)
France (0.028, 1.37) Healthcare equipment (0.029, 2.34)
3 United States (0.622, 1.27) Apparel, accessories and luxury goods (0.287, 13.59)
Italy (0.046, 3.72) Distributors (0.056, 4.98)
France (0.032, 1.60) Apparel retail (0.051, 7.91)
Thailand (0.010, 1.94) Footwear (0.046, 11.50)
Packaged foods and meats (0.032, 1.55)
4 India (0.046, 1.51) Commodity chemicals (0.128, 9.50)
Japan (0.046, 1.60) Oil and gas refining and marketing (0.072, 11.90)
Netherlands (0.027, 2.43) Fertilizers and agricultural chemicals (0.050, 13.17)
South Korea (0.025, 2.21) Industrial machinery (0.046, 2.55)
Israel (0.023, 2.23) Construction and engineering (0.044, 5.87)
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Table 3. Top 5 fractions of firms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities
in non-directed strategic alliance network. Bold font expresses remarkable attributes
with R ≥ 3.
Rank Country (fraction, R) Industry sector (fraction, R)
1 United States (0.445, 1.22) Application software (0.150, 2.83)
United Kingdom (0.068, 1.15) Internet software and services (0.127, 2.21)
France (0.036, 1.48) IT consulting and other services (0.088, 3.32)
Taiwan (0.018, 2.25) Communications equipment (0.062, 3.66)
South Korea (0.014, 12.0) Systems software (0.059, 3.79)
2 India (0.072, 2.06) Oil and gas exploration and production (0.097, 3.53)
China (0.071, 1.30) Construction and engineering (0.075, 2.18)
United Kingdom (0.067, 1.13) Aerospace and defense (0.042, 3.56)
Japan (0.066, 1.94) Industrial machinery (0.033, 2.01)
Australia (0.052, 1.56) Electric utilities (0.031, 2.74)
3 China (0.061, 1.12) Diversified banks (0.105, 7.65)
Japan (0.060, 1.75) Regional banks (0.067, 6.24)
France (0.036, 1.46) Asset management and custody banks (0.064, 2.41)
Indonesia (0.028, 2.79) Airlines (0.056, 8.90)
Hong Kong (0.026, 1.96) Hotel, resorts and cruise lines (0.048, 5.27)
4 United States (0.510, 1.40) Pharmaceuticals (0.205, 9.35)
Germany (0.040, 1.20) Biotechnology (0.192, 10.23)
France (0.029, 1.19) Life sciences tools and services (0.075, 9.11)
Switzerland (0.020, 1.86) Healthcare equipment (0.073, 5.84)
Sweden (0.017, 1.50) Healthcare facilities (0.067, 6.29)
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Table 4. Top 5 fractions of firms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities
in non-directed customer-supplier networks. Bold font expresses remarkable attributes
with R ≥ 3.
Rank Country (fraction, R) Industry sector (fraction, R)
1 United States (0.442, 1.34) Internet software and services (0.081, 2.26)
United Kingdom (0.079, 1.19) Application software (0.058, 1.79)
Japan (0.032, 1.26) Communications equipment (0.032, 2.33)
France (0.026, 1.32) IT consulting and other services (0.030, 1.55)
Taiwan (0.023, 2.27) Regional banks (0.030, 2.18)
2 India (0.103, 2.58) Construction and engineering (0.064, 1.63)
Australia (0.035, 1.24) Aerospace and defense (0.048, 3.82)
Japan (0.033, 1.32) Oil and gas exploration and production (0.041, 2.82)
Germany (0.031, 1.06) Industrial machinery (0.039, 1.73)
France (0.024, 1.19) Electric utilities (0.038, 2.66)
3 United States (0.379, 1.15) Pharmaceuticals (0.086, 5.34)
United Kingdom (0.155, 2.32) Healthcare facilities (0.070, 4.96)
Poland (0.069, 5.52) Healthcare equipment (0.056, 4.71)
Sweden (0.033, 2.96) Biotechnology (0.048, 5.89)
Norway (0.018, 2.49) Healthcare services (0.042, 4.46)
4 Indonesia (0.340, 14.91) Property and casualty insurance (0.114, 14.91)
Thailand (0.090, 7.87) Asset management and custody banks (0.073, 2.46)
Philippines (0.085, 12.26) Life and health insurance (0.058, 9.13)
Singapore (0.028, 2.07) Packaged foods and meats (0.045, 2.21)
Malaysia (0.020, 1.14) Reinsurance (0.044, 22.12)
Table 5. Top 5 fractions of firm attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major sub-
communities in largest community in customer-supplier network. Bold font expresses
remarkable attributes with R ≥ 3.
Rank Country (fraction (> 0.01), R) Industry sector (fraction (> 0.01), R)
1 United Kingdom (0.078, 1.38) Movies and entertainment (0.135, 4.73)
Israel (0.017, 1.66) Broadcasting (0.128, 6.83)
Internet software and services (0.093, 2.33)
Application software (0.074, 1.59)
Wireless telecommunication services (0.072, 8.88)
2 United States (0.663, 1.36) Apparel, accessories and luxury goods (0.0138, 6.55)
United Kingdom (0.097, 1.70) Packaged foods and meats (0.077, 3.67)
Apparel retail (0.053, 8.28)
Leisure products (0.039, 3.93)
Restaurants (0.038, 4.53)
3 United States (0.551, 1.13) Semiconductors (0.229, 11.44)
Taiwan (0.084, 8.49) Technology hardware, storage and peripheral (0.108, 7.94)
Japan (0.077, 2.71) Application software (0.084, 1.80)
South Korea (0.023, 1.99) Communications equipment (0.066, 3.36)
Israel (0.017, 1.70) Systems software (0.066, 4.78)
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Table 6. Simulated shares of conflict minerals in top 10 industry sectors in G8 and
reduction rate of conflict minerals by application of the regulation that all firms in
the “metals and mining” upper-sector and the “trading companies and distributors”
sector in G8 must not distribute conflict minerals to their customers; the qis of these
firms are one and qi = 0.3 otherwise.
Industry sector in G8 Share Reduction rate by policy
Diversified metals and mining 0.3907 –
Trading companies and distributors 0.2327 –
Gold 0.2251 –
Aluminum 0.0907 –
Commodity chemicals 0.0074 64.9%
Electrical components and equipment 0.0067 97.9%
Alternative carriers 0.0047 99.1%
Silver 0.0039 –
Oil and gas exploration/production 0.0036 5.6%
Diversified chemicals 0.0027 3.7%
Other sectors 0.0318 43.4%
Table 7. Reduction rate from amount of conflict minerals before applying regulation
to 3% firms in G8 to amount after. Reduction rates in G8 firms, non-applied G8
firms, firms outside G8, DRC, and DRC’s neighbors are numerically estimated in each
condition (see section 6).
Firms outside G8, DRC,
G8 firms Non-applied G8 firms and DRC’s neighbors
Condition 1 35.0% 1.3% 3.4%
Condition 2 43.2% 5.8% 4.0%
Condition 3 97.3% 50.5% 12.0%
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Figures
Figure 1. Global customer-supplier network in a recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or
2014). Relationships among top 1000 firms (nodes) ranked by linkages are displayed.
Each linkage color expresses a community in this network.
Figure 2. CDFs of links across firms for customer linkages (left, black), supplier
linkages (left red), licensee linkages (center, black), licensor linkages (center, red), and
strategic alliance linkages (right). Dashed lines show distribution in recent period (i.e.,
2013 and/or 2014). Solid lines show distribution in some years over entire sample
period. Guidelines express power law with an exponent of 1.5.
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Figure 3. Distributions of shortest path lengths (SPLs) for firm pairs. Left
and right figures show distributions in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or 2014) and
in some years over entire sample period. (• ), ( ), (△), (◦ ), and (⊓⊔) express
distributions in non-directed customer-supplier, non-directed licensee-licensor, non-
directed strategic alliance, directed customer-supplier, and directed licensee-licensor
networks, respectively.
Figure 4. Probability that shortest path lengths (SPLs) are extended by being limited
to domestic linkages in global customer-supplier network over entire sample period.
(• ) and ( ) are estimation results in United States and Japan. SPL for unconnected
pairs is ∞.
Figure 5. Relationship between firm size measured by total 2013 revenue and mean of
geographical distance to business partner. (• ), ( ), and (△) show customer-supplier,
licensee-licensor, and strategic alliance relationships in some years over entire sample
period, respectively.
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Figure 6. Simulated amount of conflict minerals per firm outside of DRC and its
neighbors. Model’s parameter is all qi = 0.3. Maximum amount was normalized to
one. Shades of red express logarithm amount of conflict minerals. Firms in Mali and
Guinea have many conflict minerals. Black expresses DRC. Gray shows its neighbors.
